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ACHIEVING GENDER EQUALITY IN A PLURAL
LEGAL CONTEXT; CUSTOM AND WOMEN'S
ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF LAND IN KENYA
Celestine Itumbi Nyamu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Kenyan women are largely excluded from control of land and other
key economic resources. Statistically, most of the registered land is
held in men's names. Although gender disaggregated statistics are
difficult to obtain, some studies have established that only 4% of land
is registered in women's names.' Land is crucial for women's basic
livelihood security. In addition, ownership of land is a prerequisite for
access to credit facilities and other benefits, since land is almost the
only widely acceptable form of collateral for loans. Land is a major
concern for most Kenyan women, particularly rural women who make
up 67% of the rural population. The primary and most widely held
justification for the exclusion of women from ownership and control of
land is that African customary law of most communities does not
permit women to own or have major control over land. In most ethnic
groups in Africa, a person's basic rights to land are defined by
reference to that person's position within a kinship or lineage network.
For women, access to land is closely defined by kinship and marriage
ties, and is largely dependent on marital status. Land is therefore
central in defining women's identity and social status.
At the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in
September 1995, the issue of women's equal access to economic
resources, including land, became one of the hotly contested issues.
The debate centered on the girl-child's equal right to inheritance of the
family's property. As the contest unfolded, it became clear that the
objections came from the Islamic countries, with Syria at the forefront.
The objections of these countries were perceived as a cultural relativist
. SID. Candidate, Harvard Law School; LLM. (Harvard, 1995); LL.B. (Univ. of Nairobi, 1993);
Advocate of the High Court of Kenya. The author thanks the American Association of University
Women, the Margaret McNamara Memorial Fund, the Ford Foundation, Women and Law in East Africa,
and Harvard Law School's Graduate Program for supporting her doctoral work.
'This estimate is given in a study conducted by EarthCare Africa. See Land Legislation Shuts out
Women, DAILY NATION (Nairobi) August 7, 1997, at 20.
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move. The NGO Forum's Human Rights Caucus saw this as one of
the several attempts that were being made by certain governments at
the conference to cite cultural and religious specificity as grounds for
weakening language on the universality of human rights in the Beijing
Platform of Action. They saw such moves as an attempt to reverse
earlier international documents recognizing the universality of human
rights, such as the Vienna declaration that had been adopted only in
1993.2
Syria and other Islamic countries objected to the use of the word
'equal', on the basis that Islamic law on inheritance is clear: girls
inherit half of the share inherited by their brothers. They argued that
this is justifiable because male children have greater financial
responsibility in the family.3  This objection to the use of the term
'equal' must be viewed in the broader context of the negotiations on
the language of the Beijing Platform as a whole. The debate on
whether to use the term 'equality' or 'equity' became one of the most
difficult issues to resolve in the inter-governmental negotiations on the
platform, and it was one of the very last issues to be resolved.4
Informal negotiations had been held prior to the conference to try to
come to a consensus on some of the contested issues in advance of the
conference. During these preparatory conferences, as they were
called, Islamic countries, led by Iran and Sudan, proposed to use the
word 'equity' in every instance where the document used the term
'equality'. 5 This practice continued into the conference itself, with
some Islamic countries making reservations to some provisions when
2 The issue of universality of human rights versus cultural and religious specificity was raised at the
very first meeting of the Human Rights Caucus as one of the issues that the Caucus would have to monitor
with great vigilance. The Caucus set up a working group on the issue of inter-governmental negotiations
on the language of the platform. Other working groups were set up on other issues in the platform, such
as violence against women in situations of armed conflict, displaced and refugee women, national and
international institutional arrangements, and the tension between 'equality' and 'equity' in the platform's
terminology. [Author's personal observation notes. Meeting of the Human Rights Caucus, August 31,
1995, Huairou, China.]
For an account of this and other debates at the conference, see Dzodzi Tsikata, The Beijing
Conference: Prospects for Implementation, AFRICAN AGENDA, Vol. 1. No.7 (1995), 8-12.
4 See, A Final Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, 14 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULLETIN (Number 22, Monday, 18 December 1995) [Published by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD)]. See also Statement by Mrs. Gertrude Mongela, Secretary-General,
Fourth World Conference on Women, Press Release, 13 September. 1995 WOM/BEI/Note 14.
5 Dzodzi Tsikata, supra note 3, at 12.
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they could not get the word 'equal' replaced by 'equitable'.6 NGOs
and other governments, particularly Northern governments, viewed
this as an attempt to dilute the strength of the document by leaving too
much room for discretion or arbitrariness in deciding what is
equitable.7 Anyhow, in the end, the formulation using the word
'equal' was accepted, with the understanding that 'equal right to
inheritance' does not necessarily mean 'equal shares' of inheritance.
Before this compromise was reached, I recall having a
conversation with a North American woman, an NGO participant at
the conference. She told me that she found it impressive that the
African countries were not part of this relativist move; that they did
not use the argument of culture to oppose women's equal access to
economic resources. I felt compelled to explain why I did not share
this celebratory attitude towards the African governments' apparent
position on the issue. I tried to explain that one reason for the absence
of objections on the part of African governments was because the
provision in question talked only about legal provisions, and that the
governments could choose to interpret this narrowly to refer only to
statutory provisions. That if we were talking more broadly about law,
to include that category referred to as 'African customary law',
perhaps the African governments would find it necessary to take a
position similar to that of Syria and the other states.
In this exchange, I was drawing on the conventional view
expressed in debates on the issue of application of various personal
laws alongside national statutes in societies described as legally and
culturally pluralistic.8  The position taken by people interested in
6 For example, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Jordan immediately made reservations to
paragraph 168 (b) of the draft platform, which called on governments to "strengthen the incentive role of
the state as an employer to develop a policy of equal opportunities for women and men". They made the
reservations because they could not get the other countries to agree to substitute 'equitable' for 'equal' in
the paragraph. This paragraph is now paragraph 166 (b) in the final document, and the equality language
was retained in it, as it was in the whole of the Platform for Action. See UN FOURTH WORLD
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION (1996).
My personal view is that the debate did not point to an inherent tension in the concepts of equity
and equality. Rather, my impression was that the responses were dictated more by a concern with
positioning. Since Islamic governments were the ones pushing the equity line, then all 'progressive'
forces must necessarily position themselves in opposition to them.
s The following are some writings in these debates: Barthazar A. Rwezaura, The Integration of
Marriage Laws in Africa with Special Reference to Tanzania. in LAw, SOCIETY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
139 (J.M. Abun-Nasr, U. Spellenberg & U. Wanitzek eds., 1990); Chuma Himonga, Integration of Family
Law in Zambia: Marriage and Succession Law, in LAw, SOCIETY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 163; Gordon
R. Woodman, Unification or Continuing Pluralism in Family Law in Anglophone Africa: Past
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gender equality is that although the laws in the statute books are
gender-neutral and do not discriminate against women, for instance
with regard to succession and inheritance, customary law, which has
more immediate application in most parts of the country, discriminates
against women. Culture, not law, is the problem. Culture is what is
responsible for gender imbalance and for women's exclusion from
control of resources. This view runs through several works on women
and property, set in the human rights tradition, or the 'women in
development' tradition. 9 A different view appears occasionally in
work set in the mainstream property law scholarship in Kenya. The
mainstream property law scholarship sees existing property law and
institutions as impositions of Western conceptions of property on
African indigenous institutions. Hence, I label this type of scholarship
the 'legal imposition' approach. Writers in the legal imposition school
argue, therefore, that it is in the process of imposition that women's
interests, which were previously well protected under custom, are
wiped away or compromised.' 0
Each of these views or explanations of women's position with
regard to property has its shortcomings. The explanation offered by
the legal imposition approach romanticizes custom or 'indigenous'
African property arrangements. Only a minority of writers in this
tradition are concerned with gender inequality. Even these few fail to
engage seriously and critically with women's positions in these
'indigenous' arrangements. In their view, customary arrangements
were egalitarian and it is the process of imposition that introduces
Experience, Present Realities, and Future Possibilities. 4 LESOTHO LAW JOURNAL 33 (1988); Anne
Helium, Actor Perspectives on Gender and Legal Pluralism in Africa, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY:
CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAw. 13 (Hanne Petersen & Henrik Zahle eds. 1995). Debates on legal
pluralism have also gone on with respect to contexts outside of Africa. In India, for example, the debate
on a Uniform Civil Code is continually revived by cases such as the Shah Bano case [Mohammed Ahmed
Khan v Shah Bano (1985) 2 Supreme Court Cases, 556]. For a brief historical overview of the debate on
personal laws in India, particularly on how women are positioned within the debate, see Maya Manian,
Personal Law in India: Gender. Identity and Community (JD paper. Harvard Law School, 1998).
9 Perpetua Karanja Women's Land Ownership Rights in Kenya, 1991 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES 109; Kivutha Kibwana, Law and the Status of Women in Kenya: The Example of Laikipia
District (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Working Paper No. 481 January 1992);
Florence Butegwa Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access
to Land in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 495
(Rebecca Cook ed. 1994).
'o See Okoth-Ogendo. The Imposition of Properly Law in Kenya. in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 147,
164 (Sandra B. Burman & Barbara Harrell.Bond eds. 1979) [hereinafter Imposition]; Okoth-Ogendo,
Some Issues of Theory in the Study of African Agriculture, 59 AFRICA 6 (1989).
ACHIEVING GENDER EQUALITY
differentiation, including gender-based differentiation, which then
accounts for the diminution in women's status with regard to
landholding. There seems to be no empirical basis for this egalitarian
presumption with regard to pre-colonial social order. On the contrary,
there is evidence of differentiation in pre-colonial arrangements,
suggesting that the ideal picture of an egalitarian society really
depends on whose perspective is being described."
The explanation offered by the human rights and women in
development approach, attributing women's conditions to a vague
notion of 'culture' or 'custom', masks the role played by formal legal
institutions in creating those conditions and exonerates the state from
having to deal with the issue in any serious manner. A vague notion of
'culture' will always be the elusive culprit. Kenya's national report to
the Beijing conference illustrates this very clearly. It states,
Kenya's constitution and laws do not discriminate against women.
However, certain traditional practices inhibit women's equal
access to and ownership of property. The law of succession
enacted in July 1981, gave both men and women equal rights of
ownership and disposal of property and was, therefore, an
empowerment for women who traditionally were not allowed to
inherit family property.12
The report is replete with 'cultural explanations' for diverse issues
such as low participation of women in politics, violence against
women and the role of women in policy design. On the
implementation of land policies, the report states,
Soon after independence, the Kenya Government embarked on a
resettlement programme to resettle the landless. Through the
programme, land titles deeds were and are still issued to men and
" Some scholars in legal anthropology and legal history identify a tendency, in debates on pre-
colonial social, economic and political arrangements, to present them as non-conflictual, in contrast to
'imposed' Western forms, or in contrast to the exercise of state power in a post-colonial setting, invoking
ideals of 'harmony'. See JUNE STARR & JANE F. COLLIER, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1989) [Introduction],
12 Republic of Kenya, National Report Prepared for the Fourth World Conference on Women to be
held in Beijing, China, 4-15 September, 1995 (May 1994), [hereinafter Kenya National Report] at 5.
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women without discrimination although due to cultural factors,
men outnumber women. 13
Both positions pay little attention to the reality of interaction
between prevailing notions of custom and formal legal institutions, and
how women are affected significantly by this interaction. However, a
third view is emerging. This view looks at ways in which women
living in a plural legal setting deal with the complex and dynamic
intersection of prevailing notions of local customs and national formal
legal structures. It attempts to go beyond the dichotomy between
custom and formal legal institutions and processes. It remains
conscious of the continuous interaction between them. Therefore,
rather than blame either custom or 'imposed Western institutions', it
focuses on what works in seeking to redress gender inequality in
property relations, whether what works can be characterized as
belonging in the cultural sphere, in the sphere of formal legal
structures, or in the overlap between them. I have given this approach
the provisional label of 'a critical pragmatic' approach to pluralism.
This paper sets out to examine these three broad approaches and, in
so doing, to argue for adoption and further development of the third. I
devote a major part of the paper to questioning two basic assumptions
implicit in the first two approaches. First, there seems to be an
assumption that conceptually, there can be a clear divide between
formal law and custom or that, in issues of gender inequality, it is
possible to clearly identify one side of the formal law/custom divide as
the oppressor, and the other as the liberator. In this paper, I question
the idea that we can coherently speak of such a divide in contemporary
Kenya, and ask what consequences the deployment of this binary
between formal law and custom has for the achievement of gender
equality. My position is that this binary cannot be sustained. Formal
law and custom intersect in rather overt ways. Often, their intersection
results in the undermining of women's control over resources. The
state is actively involved in shaping custom, and the two ostensibly
separate systems reinforce each other. Kenya's land relations illustrate
this interdependent relationship, as I will demonstrate.
3 1d. at23.
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Secondly, there appears also to be an assumption concerning the
very nature of customary law itself. In both views that I discuss, the
existence and coherence of customary law as a category is taken for
granted, as is its antiquity, authenticity and historical continuity. This
gives the impression that this category (customary law) has always
existed with very little, if any, change, and is 'innate' to a community.
Both mainstream property law legal imposition scholarship, and
human rights activism and scholarship, take for granted the existence
and coherence of customary law as a legal category, without
questioning the process through which the category as a whole came to
exist, and how certain rules within it come into existence. They do not
question the power relations implicit in its creation. Yet it is crucial to
examine whose interests are served by portraying custom as
unchanging in a specific instance.
I have divided the article into five parts, the first being the
introduction. In the second part, I outline the key features of the
mainstream property law (legal imposition) approach. I then critique
this approach in light of the two assumptions identified above, namely
reifying a dichotomy between customary law and formal law, failing
to take account of the dynamic nature of customary law, and failing to
recognize the power relations inherent in the dynamic process of
shaping custom. In part 1II, I outline the human rights and 'women in
development' approaches, identifying three key strategies that the
scholars and activists in these schools have used in confronting gender
inequality with regard to property relations. I similarly critique these
two approaches in light of the two assumptions identified above. In
part IV I build on my critiques of the approaches discussed to propose
alternative approaches to addressing gender inequality in property
relations in a plural legal context. I refer to frameworks of analysis
that may be helpful in conceptualizing appropriate or effective
approaches in a plural legal context, such as the semi-autonomous
social field, the intersectionality of gender and culture, and critical
pragmatism. Finally, in part V, I draw some brief conclusions.
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II. GENDER AND CUSTOM IN MAINSTREAM PROPERTY RELATIONS
SCHOLARSHIP
The major preoccupation of property relations scholarship in
Kenya has been with the imposition of individualistic Western laws
and concepts of property on African people who relate to the land in a
communal context. The basic argument of this school is that the
imposition of Western notions of property disturbed the stability of
African land tenure arrangements.' 4  In making this argument, they
presume that customary law arrangements were defined and
conclusive.
The legal imposition approach, in analyzing post-colonial legal and
institutional settings, is influenced by the 'dependency' school of
thought which gained popularity in the mid to late 1970s in Africa and
Latin America. 5 Dependency thinking attributes underdevelopment in
Africa to structures of global capitalism and post-independence
collaboration between African elites and foreign capital to serve their
own interests at the expense of the poor majority of Africans. The
preservation of colonial agrarian institutions and land tenure policies,
to the detriment of indigenous African institutions, is therefore seen as
part of this collaboration. Professor Okoth-Ogendo, who is regarded
as one of the leading property law scholars in Kenya, analyzes the
institutional structures governing property relations in Kenya in these
terms of dependency:
At the macro-level continuous imposition of law can be seen as an
expression of dependency relations between the Third-World (the
4 Okoth-Ogendo, Imposition, supra, note 10. See also Rudi W. James, Land Tenure Reform in
Developing Countries: From Westernization to Indigenization, 12 EASTERN AFRICA L R. 1 (1976);
Bondi Ogoila, The Legal Regime and the Peasantry: The Case of Land Reform in Kenya, 4 NAIROBI
UNIV. L. J. 109 (1987); Gibson Kamau Kuria, The Role of Customary Land Tenure in Rural Development
in Kenya, (Unpublished paper presented at the Seminar on Law and Rural Development, Kisumu, Kenya
1977).
15 For a brief overview of the trends in dependency theory scholarship generally see Brian
Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law and Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L LAW 470 (1995). The legal
imposition school has remained the dominant mode of analysis of land relations in Kenya, particularly by
legal scholars and activists. See. for example, OKOTH-OGENDO, TENANTS OF THE CROWN: EVOLUTION
OF AGRARIAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA (1991); Gibson Kamau Kuria, id Arguments on
imposition of Western legal and institutional arrangements on African societies are not unique to property
law. They have also been made with regard to Western liberal democratic institutions, see JACKTON B.
OJWANG, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION AND SOCIAL
CHANGE (1990), and with regard to family law, see Gibson Kamau Kuria, Christianity and Family Law in
Kenya, 12 EAST AFRICAN L J. 33 (1976).
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periphery) and industrialized nations (the metropole centers).... [The]
impetus for imposition of law can be seen at this level as being
generated from without rather than arising from within. 16
He traces the impetus for legal imposition as coming also from
within; from local elites who are committed to the survival of the
imposed system, whose effect is to "restructure the flow of national
resources in a manner that increases the inequality of the distribution
of benefits in the society".'
The imposition approach has played a very important role in
showing that African land relations were, in the colonial encounter,
viewed through conceptual categories created by Western property
theory, and how these perceptions have continued to shape legal and
institutional structures governing property relations in post-colonial
Africa. However, the legal imposition analysis has two major
shortcomings, which are relevant to our discussion on the binary
between law and custom, and the consequences that it has for women:
first, it pays inadequate attention to gender in the clear divide it
constructs between law and custom. Mainstream scholarship on
property relations in Kenya and other African countries completely
ignores gender relations. This can be attributed to the fact that the
field has remained dominated by a narrow class of scholars who have
little interest in gender issues. Furthermore, there are hardly any
women scholars doing mainstream property relations scholarship. The
few who do write on property relations are more accurately described
as being in the human rights and women in development school, since
they are concerned with gender inequality in property relations.' 8
Second, mainstream property law scholarship, in describing customary
t6 Okoth-Ogendo, Imposition, supra note 10, at 148.
., Id. at 148-9.
18 Women scholars who have written on property relations in Kenya include Achola Pala Okeyo (an
anthropologist), see Women's Access to Land and Their Role in Agriculture and Decision-Making on the
Farm: Experiences of the Joluo of Kenya, 13 J. EAST AFR. RESEARCH & DEV. 69 (1983), Janet Kabeberi-
Macharia (a lawyer) see Women and Property in Kenya: Towards Equal Inequality? (Working Paper
No.13, NORAD Institute of Women Law, November. 1988)i Perpetua Karanja, (a lawyer) supra note 9,
and historian TABITHA KANOGO, SQUATTERS AND THE ROOTs OF MAU MAU, 1905-63 (1987). Since
1991. several scholars and activists involved in the Women and Law in East Africa research project have
been carrying out research and writing on issues such as inheritance and matrimonial property. WLEA
publications include THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN KENYA: GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL (1995),
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arrangements, ignores the power relations that shape customary land
tenure arrangements.
A. Reification of the Dichotomy Between Formal Law & Custom,
Western Institutions & Indigenous Institutions
Legal imposition analysis in mainstream property law scholarship
is characterized by dichotomy: between Western (imposed) institutions
and indigenous institutions; between formal law and custom. The
manner in which legal imposition scholars deal with gender, when
they do deal with gender at all, illustrates the reification of these
distinctions.
Although mainstream property analyses link the process of
'imposition' of Western property notions and institutions to inequality
in the distribution of benefits in society, they ignore gender relations as
a factor in the manner in which property relations are defined. Some
writings in this tradition do allude to the fact that women's proprietary
rights were weakened as a result of the legal imposition of Western
concepts of property. Where this observation is made, the tendency is
to blame the process of imposition and the 'imposed institutions' for
women's disadvantaged position, and to romanticize what was there in
the past under customary tenure as purportedly offering protection to
women. For these writers there is a clear distinction between formal
law (imposed) and custom (indigenous). The imposed law is the
'oppressor', eroding, in its wake, protective measures previously
available to women under the indigenous institutions. For example, at
the end of his essay on the imposition of property law in Kenya,
Okoth-Ogendo observes:
an economy that depends so heavily on female labour cannot really
afford to weaken the proprietary status of women over land.
Customary property law ... avoided this by separating access rights
from control and subjecting control to the economic tasks required
by reason of the former. The economic role of women in
indigenous society, it must be emphasized, depended largely on the
protection of their access rights to land.19
9Okoth-Ogendo, Imposition, supra, note 10, at 164.
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20I acknowledge, as do other writers , that various measures under
customary tenure, such as restrictions on outright sale of land, offered
protection to the interests of family members, especially women and
children. The statement quoted, however, goes beyond this to
legitimate customary property arrangements in their entirety and to
preempt any questioning of the actual nature of property rights that are
accorded to women within them. In other words, Okoth-Ogendo
romanticizes customary tenure by arguing that everything was good
for women before the imposed institutions came in. In this mode of
analysis, it is the process of fitting customary tenure into the narrow
categories of property rights created by Western property theory that
results in the dispossession experienced by women. The legal
imposition school does not pin responsibility for remedying this
situation on any specific existing institution, in the same way that the
human rights/development diagnosis identifies a vague notion of
culture/custom as the culprit. It also leaves unanswered the question
of what to make of existing arrangements that are described as
customary. Does this romanticizing of custom preclude contemporary
criticism of present 'customary' arrangements?
The central issue for me is not to determine which entity -law or
custom - is responsible for women's present status with regard to
access to property. It is more instructive to examine how, in the
present setting, social practices justified by custom interact in complex
ways and at various levels with government policy to undermine the
position of women with regard to control of economic resources.
Customary land law has influenced and, in turn, has at the same time
been influenced, altered and reproduced in government policy. One
example of this process of interaction is the on-going tenure reform
program, under which the Kenya Government is undertaking to
register under statute all land that is currently unregistered, and which
is therefore presumed to be held under customary tenure. 2 1
20 Achola Pala Okeyo, supra note 18, Perpetua Karanja, supra note 9.
21 This policy, commonly referred to as the tenure reform program, was initiated in the 1950s by the
colonial government. The policy has resulted in land disputes, typically between the individual(s)
registered as statutory owners and other family members asserting their claims to the land on the basis of
custom. For a detailed discussion of the tenure reform program and the resultant land disputes see
Celestine 1. Nyamu, Land Dispute Processing in Kenya: A View on the Land Disputes Tribunals Act of
1990 (1992) (LL.B. Dissertation, University of Nairobi).
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The process of tenure reform is a three step process involving
adjudication (to determine existing interests in the land),
consolidation22 , and registration. The process culminates in official
registration and issuance of a document to evidence title. Usually,
registration is effected in the name of one person as the official
'owner' of the land, even where it is more appropriately described as
family land. The understanding of most family members is that the
person so registered, usually the father or eldest brother, is registered
in a representative capacity. Obviously the implementation of this
policy has made women's position in relation to land even more
insecure. The exercise has resulted predominantly in the registration
of men as individual proprietors of land on the basis that they are the
'male heads of households', a result largely influenced by cultural bias
on the part of the implementers of the policy.23 It should be noted that
nothing in the land statutes prevents women from being registered
either as individual or joint owners of land. Neither do the statutes
require that the land must be registered in the name of a male head of
24household. Further, the title granted under the statute is absolute and
entitles the man (official title holder) to sell or mortgage the land at
will, with no regard for obligations he might have had to other
family/clan members under custom. Therefore, women's rights of
access previously guaranteed under customary law, even though very
limited, become even more insecure, as a result of this interaction
between cultural perceptions or biases, and a government policy keen
on entrenching an individualized private property regime.
The following scenario illustrates this heightened insecurity. In the
case of Elizabeth Wangari Wanjohi & Elizabeth Wambui Wanjohi v
22 Consolidation involves offering an adjoining piece of land to a person who holds pieces of land
that are not adjacent to one another in exchange for one that is far away. It is a kind of a swap that is
supposed to result in land holding units of an economically viable size. Consolidation as a mandatory
policy was abandoned in 1968 as a result of social and political resistance. It is now treated as optional.
See Okoth-Ogendo, Reforming Land Tenure in Africa: Conceptual, Methodological and Policy Issues 12
(1996) (unpublished).
23 One registration official was asked why they registered only men. He replied, "it is customary
that men hold land in our societies; therefore it stands to reason that they should hold land titles as well".
See Achola 0. Pala, African Women in Rural Development: Research Trends and Priorities 3 (OLC
Papers No. 12, December 1976).
24 See Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284 of the Laws of Kenya (1970, revised 1977) Land
Consolidation Act, Chapter 283 of the Laws of Kenya (1964, revised 1977). On male bias in registration
see Achola 0. Pala, supra note 23; Kivutha Kibwana, supra note 9.
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Official Receiver and Interim Liquidator (Continental Credit Finance
Limited)25 two brothers mortgaged the family's piece of land.
Unfortunately, they both died before they had completed the loan
repayment. The financial institution that had advanced them the loan
went into liquidation, and the official receiver sought to auction the
piece of land to recover the outstanding amount. Their widows tried to
stop the auction from proceeding, arguing that their rights as occupants
under customary law had not been taken into account. The Court of
Appeal (the highest court in Kenya), in deciding the case, made a
general ruling that a wife's rights of access under customary law,
acquired solely by virtue of marriage, are extinguished upon
registration of her husband as sole proprietor. 26  On the general
question of the effect of registration of land on customary law-based
claims of family members however, the Kenyan judiciary has issued
conflicting judgements. One line of cases has maintained that the
process of registration frees the land from customary practices, and27
therefore customary interests are extinguished upon registration. On
the other hand, another line of cases holds that any person registered as
sole proprietor of land previously held under 'communal' customary
tenure must be presumed to be registered as trustee.28 The Court of
Appeal in the case I have summarized above endorses the first view,
that registration extinguishes all pre-existing interests based on
customary law, or all interests not subsequently noted on the register.
The widows' claims as wives under customary law were therefore
overridden by the claims of the financial institution.
Thus, examining the interaction of custom with formal legal
institutions, rather than treating them as separate systems, yields a
more complete picture, since it forces us to examine both the
institutional policy-making level and the household/community
relations level, and ways in which they interact and affect each other.
25 CIVIL APPLICATION NAI. No. 140 of 1988.
26 id.
2 Examples of cases that have taken this approach include Obiero v. Opiyo (1972) East Africa Law
Reports, 227; Esiroyo v. Esiroyo (1973) East Africa Law Reports. 388; Belinda Murai v. Amos Wainaina
CIVIL APPEAL No.45 NAIROBI (1977).
28 Examples of cases that have taken this approach include Muguthu v. Muguthu HIGH COURT CIVIL
CASE NO. 377 NAIROBI (1968, Unreported); Samuel Thata Misheck v. Priscilla Wambui & Wanjiku,
HIGH COURT CIVIL CASE NO. 1400 NAIROBI (1973, Unreported); Allan Kiama v. Ndia Muthunya &
others, CIVIL APPEAL No. 42 NAIROBI (1978, Unreported).
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This interaction affects social and interpersonal relationships,
including gender relationships at the household and community levels.
Analysis at this level enables us to examine crucial questions such as
the effect of the introduction of statutory land registration on the
obligations of the person so registered as land holder, and on who
controls women's labour in the altered relations to the land. 29  This
analysis is important in understanding the basis upon which gender
roles and property relations have been defined both within the context
of land held under customary tenure and land registered under
statutory land law.
B. Inadequate Understanding of Power Relations in Shaping
Custom
The second shortcoming of the legal imposition school is that the
scholars present pre-existing customary law arrangements in a
somewhat functional manner, as a structural entity which is stable and
precise, almost as 'the natural order of things'. They present
customary tenurial arrangements as an internally coherent and closed
system, which the 'imposed institutions' sought to supplant and
replace.30 Among these scholars, only Okoth Ogendo has a somewhat
problematized presentation of customary land tenure, that refers to the
existence of 'internal conflicts' in indigenous property law. 31
However, the meaning he attaches to internal conflict is somewhat
narrow, simply to concede to the fact that notions akin to 'private
ownership' had already begun to emerge in a predominantly
2 On the question of women's labour in the altered relations to land, a Ugandan author observes that
women experience adverse consequences of the combination of negative customary attitudes on
'ownership' of land by women with specific doctrines in English property law that state that whoever
owns the land owns whatever is attached to the land. This makes it difficult, for instance in situations of
inheritance, for women to claim entitlement to developments they have effected on land that was legally
owned by their husbands, and to enforce these claims against the legal (male) heir, particularly where the
legally recognized heir under customary law is not in the widow's immediate family. See Ulian
Ekirikubinza Tibatemwa, Property Rights, Institutional Credit and the Gender Question in Uganda, 2
EAST AFR. J. PEACE & H. RTS. 68. 70-71 (1995).
30 See especially Okoth-Ogendo, Imposition supra note 10, at 157:
The imposition of English property law and institutions had important
consequences for the stability of the situation [of African land tenure] described
above.
See also Rudi W. James, supra note 14; Bondi Ogolla, supra note 14; Gibson K. Kuria, supra note
14.
31 Okoth-Ogendo, Imposition, supra note 10, at 160.
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communal system. What I am concerned with uncovering is the
'conflict' involved in the processes of determining what gets to be
accepted as one's position in customary tenure arrangements, or one's
entitlement under it.
The classic legal imposition approach evades the complex issues
regarding the contested nature of customary law, and the power
dynamics at play in defining and shaping 'taken-for-granted' or
officially accepted notions of customary law. This comes out clearly
in the imposition scholars' descriptions of the manner in which
'property rights' are/were assigned to various people under customary
tenure. In a later article, Okoth-Ogendo argues that African land
tenure relations are more usefully understood as being based on the
"production functions... assigned to individual members of society at
different points in the social cycle".32 He goes on to argue that access
to power to control land is "attached to membership of some unit of
production". 33 Therefore, the extent of a person's property in land will
be determined by his/her membership status. What I find disturbing is
that there is no mention of the exercise of power implicated in the
'assigning of production functions'. There is no discussion about who
gets to decide one's membership status within the relevant land-
holding unit, be it a family, clan, lineage or community at large.
Furthermore, this analysis takes for granted the differences in
membership status, as though these are predetermined and fixed. That
issues of gender would be implicated in such an inquiry goes without
saying. The reality of constant and dynamic negotiation and conflict
over these statuses is totally absent from this analysis. Therefore,
property law scholarship as a whole is oblivious to the ways in which
women subversively challenge notions of their position in customary
tenure arrangements.
The idea that customary law of land tenure is a continually
contested concept and continues to be an arena of struggle has been
written about by some legal anthropologists and African historians.
There are accounts that show that customary law, particularly as it
relates to land tenure, was initially shaped and articulated within the
32 Okoth-Ogendo, Some Issues of Theory in the Study of Tenure Relations in African Agriculture
supranote 10, at 6, 10.
3 Id.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
context of a struggle - the struggle against colonial expropriation of
land belonging to African communities. 34  Such analyses show how
those with power are able to construct customary land tenure in their
favour.35  Yet the effect of gendered relations of power is not
acknowledged in the construction of customary law.
In the context of gender, men have had the upper hand since the
colonial period when the application of customary law in courts made
it necessary for customary norms to be formally articulated. The
formal articulation of customary law into a legal category that could be
cited in court proceedings has resulted in abstractions of custom into a
rule-like structure that denies the flexibility and variation that exists in
the practice at the local level.36 Women have had little influence in
this process of shaping and articulation of officially recognized
customary law. It was predominantly men who served as informants,
interpreters and, later, judicial officers in the colonial regime.
Customary law during this period was therefore largely, but not
exclusively, shaped by the attitudes and interests of male elders and
the perceptions of the colonial administration officers.
[The] development of an area of customary law depended on a
correspondingly appropriate image being available in the legal
repertoire of the colonial rulers. 7
The experience of Southern Africa illustrates this point. Colonial
judges were influenced by English jurisprudence which did not, until
1882, recognize the capacity of married women to own property, and
3 Martin Chanock, Paradigms, Policies and Property: A Review of the Customary Law of Land
Tenure, in LAW IN COLONIAL AFRICA 61, 62 (Kristin Mann & Richard Roberts eds. 1991).
35 Nancy O'Rourke, Land Rights and Gender Relations in Areas of Rural Africa: A Question of
Power and Discourse, 4 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUD. 75 (1995).
3 For further discussion on the flexibility and negotiability of customary law in its various aspects,
including inheritance, see SALLY FALK MOORE. SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: CUSTOMARY LAW
ON KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980 (1986). On flexibility regarding inheritance specifically, see SALLY FALK
MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGY APPROACH 243 (1978):
Laws of inheritance that appear to be reproducing a social situation from generation
to generation may in fact be accommodating changes that are not acknowledged as
such. Declarations that there has been continuity of legal norms over the
generations are not necessarily an indication that such has been the case. The past
may be formally invoked to legitimize the present; yet the actual practices may be
only selectively perpetuated, and change may be accommodated under the cloak of
ancestral custom.
37 Martin Chanock, A Peculiar Sharpness: An Evsay on Property in the History of Customary Law in
Colonial Africa, 32 JNL. APR. HIST. 65, 79 (1991).
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Roman-Dutch law which barred women married under community of
property from owning property in their own right. The idea that
women should not own property was not unusual. Thus, through
various court decisions, the 'African customary' rule that women
could not inherit or own property was developed. In reality, flexibility
abounds in the practice of the various African communities. This
distorting ossification of customary law was not resisted by the
African male informants who were in a position to do so, since it
favoured them.
I am not suggesting that gender conflicts in defining custom,
specifically with regard to property arrangements, only date back to
the colonial period, or that such conflict was unknown in pre-colonial
times.38 Rather, as Chanock demonstrates, the colonial experience
sharpened and redefined on-going gender struggles. Colonial
institutions such as courts, simply provided new sites on which the
numerous social conflicts and readjustments (including gender) were
lived out. Men strove to portray themselves as having absolute power
over women and other members of their families. They portrayed
gender inequality as 'customary'.59 The legal imposition school and
other legal analysts of property relations in Kenya have overlooked
legal anthropological analysis of customary law that points to the
flexible and adaptive nature of custom.
III. GENDER AND CUSTOM IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND 'WOMEN IN
DEVELOPMENT' WORK
The human rights and 'women in development' schools of thought
have developed largely from activist or 'practice oriented'
perspectives, seeking to justify ownership and control of property by
women. In doing so, they have utilized arguments from the human
3S Cf OYERONKE OyEwuMI, THE INVENTION OF WOMEN: MAKING AN AFRICAN SENSE OF
WESTERN GENDER DISCOURSES ix (1997). Oyewumi argues that the category 'gender' is a Western
imposition that "simply did not exist in Yoruba culture prior to its sustained contact with the West". She
would therefore rule out any gender-based conflict or tension in pre-colonial Yoruba society.
3 9 MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI
AND ZAMBIA 38 (1985). See also T. Nhlapo, Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: Taking Human
Rights and Cultural Diversity Seriously. 1994-95 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 49, 58-60. Nhlapo
shows that in fact through 'officialized' customary law in the colonial setting, women were placed outside
of the domain of law which, under the influence of Roman-Dutch law, recognized only the 'head of
household' as the only true person in law.
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rights arena and from the discourse on gender equity in development.
In practice, however, in the Kenyan context, many writers combine
both approaches without distinction. One common feature shared by
the human rights and the women in development approaches is the
idea that custom is an obstacle that needs to be overcome or
eradicated.
In this part, I outline three strategies employed by these scholars
and activists, namely constitutional arguments, utilizing international
human rights instruments, and emphasizing women's control over
resources in a manner commensurate with their productive roles in the
development process. I will then critique these analyses in light of the
two underlying assumptions I outlined in the introduction.
One strategy employed by human rights activists is to look to the
Constitution for protection of women's land rights. Writers applying
human rights approaches have made formal equality arguments based
on a right to property and equal treatment under the Kenya
Constitution and under international human rights law.4° Using the
Kenya Constitution they have argued that failure to recognize
women's rights to inheritance and women's entitlement to a share of
matrimonial property on the basis of women's non-monetary
contribution violates both the constitutional protection of property
rights and the guarantee of equal enjoyment of fundamental rights and
freedoms under the Constitution. 4f However, relying on the
Constitution or making constitutional arguments in the Kenyan context
presents insurmountable problems. The operation of customary law as
a legal category in contemporary Kenya is sanctioned by the
Constitution and by the Judicature Act.42 Section 3 of the Judicature
Act addresses in a general manner the position of customary law in
Kenya's legal system, and the criteria to be applied by courts in
40 See Kivutha Kibwana, Women and the Constitution in Kenya, 25 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN
UBERSEE [LAW & POLITICS IN AFRICA, ASIA & LATIN AMERICA] 6 (1992); Law and the Status of Women
in Kenya, supra note 9; Perpetua Karanja, supra note 9; Smokin Wanjala, Towards a Uniform Law of
Matrimonial Property in Kenya, in WOMEN AND AUTONOMY IN KENYA: LAW REFORM AND THE QUEST
FOR GENDER EQUALITY 236 (Center for Law and Research International (CLARION) Monograph No.1
1994); Timothy Mweseli, The Law of Succession, in WOMEN AND AUTONOMY IN KENYA: LAw REFORM
AND THE QUEST FOR GENDER EQUALITY 258 (1994).
41 See, for example, Kivutha Kibwana, Women and the Constitution in Kenya, supra note 40, at 15.42 Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kenya (1967, revised 1988).
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determining the applicability of customary law in a particular case. 3
The constitutional provisions reserve the application of customary law
in matters of personal law, such as marriage, divorce, devolution of
property on death, custody and adoption of children and burial. These
provisions [section 82 (3) and (4)] are of particular importance to a
discussion on issues affecting women, and I use them to illustrate the
way in which the Kenyan legal system has created a binary between
law and custom, in such a manner as to impact women very
significantly.
Section 82 is the section in Kenya's constitutional bill of rights that
prohibits discrimination." In defining discriminatory conduct,
however, Section 82 does not list 'sex' as one of the constitutionally
prohibited grounds for discrimination. In addition, section 82 (4)
insulates practices carried out in accordance with customary law from
constitutional scrutiny by providing as follows:
Subsection (1) [prohibition of discrimination] shall not apply to
any law so far as that law makes provision --
(a)...(b) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution
of property on death or other matters of personal law;
(c) for the application in the case of members of a particular race
or tribe of customary law.
Thus, sub-section 4 of section 82 introduces exceptions; instances
in which the prohibition of discrimination will not apply. Only 2 of
those exceptions [paragraphs (b) and (c)] are relevant for this
discussion. The first exception is that the prohibition of discrimination
will not apply to any law dealing with matters of adoption, marriage,
divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of
43 Section 3 of the Judicature Act provides that customary law will be applicable in cases in which
all or one of the parties to a dispute is subject to or affected by such customary law. In addition,
customary law will not be applied if it contradicts a written law, and if it is repugnant to justice and
morality.
44 There has been debate concerning sub-section 3 of section 82, which defines 'discriminatory'.
The sub-section does not list sex as one of the factors on the basis of which it is unlawful to discriminate.
Yet section 70 guarantees equal enjoyment of the rights contained in the constitution regardless of race,
tribe, place of origin, as well as sex. In response to pressure from various sectors of the Kenyan public, a
process is being put into place to carry out comprehensive constitutional reforms, focussing on Kenya's
governance structure. A women's political caucus has taken advantage of this process to include among
these reforms an amendment to include the word 'sex' in section 82 (3) of the constitution.
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personal law. In summary, this provision reserves the application of
the various customary and religious laws (termed 'personal' laws) in
the areas of family law and succession. It makes it possible for these
multiple and disparate systems to continue operating, without
offending the constitutional prohibition of differential treatment or
discrimination.
The second exception applies to any law that is intended 'for the
application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of
customary law' with respect to any aspect not covered in a law that is
generally applicable to all Kenyans with respect to a particular matter.
The meaning of this provision is illustrated by one aspect of the S.M.
Otieno case. 45 The case involved a burial dispute between a widow
and her husband's clan, represented by her brother-in-law and a clan
official. She wanted him buried in the Nairobi area, in the sub-urban
home where the family lived. Her husband's clan wanted him buried
in Nyanza, at his parents' 'ancestral' home. The only Kenyan law that
addressed burial issues was the Public Health Act, which only deals
with the hygienic disposal of dead bodies. It contains no legal
provision on who is the person entitled to conduct burial. Therefore,
Luo customs on burial were applied, over the widow's objections that
these customs were discriminatory as they left her with no say in her
husband's burial. The widow herself did not belong to the Luo ethnic
group, and this heightened the tension in the case, and in political
discourse in the country at the time.46 The court invoked the exception
in section 82(4) to rule that the customs in question were outside the
purview of the anti-discrimination provisions, and that therefore it was
proper to apply Luo burial customs in this case.
These exceptions make it impossible for people to challenge
treatment justified on customary or religious law, which they consider
to be unfair. By foreclosing people's ability to challenge unfair
treatment justified on customary law grounds, Kenya's constitutional
jurisprudence sets up a separate realm of custom that is beyond legal
challenge. Any norms or practices that can be described as being in
45 Virginia Edith Wambui Otieno.v- Joash Ougo & Omolo Siranga, HIGH COURT CIVIL CASE NO.
4872 NAIROBI (1986); I KENYAN APPEAL REPORTS 1049 (1982-88).
4 On the political debate that the case generated at a national level, and the influence of the case on
national politics (including the politics of the Kenyan judiciary), see BLAINE HARDEN, AFRICA:
DISPATCHES FROM A FRAGILE CONTINENT (1990), Chapter 3, "Battle for the Body".
ACHIEVING GENDER EQUALITY
accordance with customary law (or any other 'personal law' for that
matter) are shielded from constitutional scrutiny. In effect, the state is
taking a 'hands off' attitude toward customary law, and portraying it as
something that happens in a private sphere or cultural space in which
the state cannot intervene. This attitude masks the law's responsibility
for women's disadvantaged position in various situations, by
obscuring the ways in which formal legal institutions and processes,
on the one hand, and prevailing notions of custom, on the other,
interact and, in some cases, reinforce each other. This set-up has
potential negative implications for any attempt to confront
exclusionary notions that invoke custom to bar women from control of
economic resources.
On its surface, it appears that the constitutional provision in section
82(4) is necessary to prevent unjustified state interference with
traditional and religious laws of various groups. However, this ignores
the ways in which the state has been active, both in the colonial and
post-colonial period, in shaping customary law. Understanding the
interactions/interdependence/ between the state and customary law
would help to make it clear that custom is not some elusive culture out
there, but a legally sanctioned entity. This would enable us to argue
that it is hypocritical for the state to turn around, as section 82(4) does,
and say that customary law is purely in the private sphere, and that the
state cannot intervene on behalf of people who claim to have been
treated unfairly on the basis of custom. The notion of non-intervention
is highly suspect. In fact, the stance of the state in Section 82(4), far
from being non-interventionist is highly interventionist, in the sense
that the state has already set up a framework that endorses or ensures
the continuing existence of a particular status quo. The state is never a
neutral actor.47 We would then call upon the state to open up this
avenue in order for people to exercise the option of challenging their
own cultural norms without the overarching state norms telling them
that they cannot.
A second strategy of human rights activists is to rely on
international human rights arguments to demonstrate the inadequacy of
47 For a powerful critique that shows that state non-intervention, particularly in the 'private sphere'
of the family, is a myth, see Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L.REv. 1497-1578 (1983). See also Frances Olsen. The Myth of State Intervention in
the Family, 18 MICH. J. LAW REFORM 835-864 (1985).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
national laws and institutions.48 This strategy is based on the principle
of non-discrimination, and on the duties imposed by the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) on governments to abolish or modify laws
and customs which constitute discrimination against women.49 Their
arguments have relied primarily on the principle of non-discrimination
in article 2 , particularly article 2(f) which imposes obligations on
states parties "to take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women., 50
Human rights arguments also make reference to article 16(h)
which exhorts governments to ensure, on the basis of equality of men
and women "The same rights for both spouses in respect of the
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and
disposition of property..."5
Further, article 14, which deals with the particular problems faced
by rural women, is also helpful. In particular, article 14(g) requires
states to guarantee women equal access to agricultural credit and
loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment
in land and agrarian reform, as well as in land resettlement schemes.
To a smaller extent, writers have also sought to rely on regional
human rights instruments, such as the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.5 2 Florence Butegwa bases her argument for women's
access to property on the non-discrimination principle, tracing it to the
African Charter's provisions on discrimination against women.
Within international human rights scholarship on women's rights
broadly, however, the question of control of economic resources such
as land by women has not gained prominence. This is illustrated by
the fact that when the issue of equal inheritance by girls and boys, and
4' Jane B. Knowles, Women's Access to Land in Africa, 1991 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES I[citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and CEDAW's provision in Article 14 (g) on rural
women's right to equal treatment in land and agrarian reforms]; Marsha Freeman, Women, Law and Land:
Claiming Women's Human Rights in Domestic Legal Systems, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 559 (1994).
49 U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 2 (f).
UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1249 No. 20378 (1979).
5o CEDAW art. I(0. I have used this argument in previous work. See Celestine Nyamu, Rural
Women in Kenya and the Legitimacy of Human Rights Discourse and Institutions, in LEGrrITMATE
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 263 (E.K. Quashigah & O.C. Okafor eds. 1999).
51 For work that uses this argument see Jane Knowles, supra note 48.
52 See Florence Butegwa. supra note 9.
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women's access to economic resources became one of the most
heavily contested issues at the Beijing Conference 53 it was more a
concern of the Economic Justice caucus, and other smaller caucuses
such as the African Women's caucus and the Rural Women's caucus,
than the Human Rights caucus. The Economic Justice caucus was
made up mostly of NGOs that do social justice, development and aid
related work, while the Human Rights caucus was composed mainly of
mainstream international human rights groups, with some
representation of national human rights NGOs from developing
countries.
54
A third strategy is adopted by women in development activists who
have argued that women should have rights to land commensurate with
their producer roles in the economy. They argue that exclusion of
women from land ownership, and therefore from effective
participation in economic development defeats the economic goals of
the country:
An empowered and flexible woman in property matters, even
within the strictures of matrimony, is certain to make a qualitative
and more enduring contribution to the expected vibrancy of the
economy and the social good.55
This argument emphasizes overall national economic well-being,
rather than women's entitlement to control of resources and
participation in the development process as a matter of right.56 I
53 See Statement by Mrs. Gertrude Mongela, supra note 4. On the compromise reached on the
question of inheritance and women's access to economic resources see Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, supra note 6, paragraph 62 (f) and 63 (b).
"' Within the Economic Justice caucus there was a lobby of groups concerned with the issue of
counting women's unpaid work in national statistics (GNP and GDP or in satellite accounts). They were
at the forefront in monitoring the negotiations to ensure that clauses on women's access to resources were
retained in strong language in the Platform. They recognized that valuation of women's unpaid labour
would have positive implications for women's property rights and ownership of the products of their
labour, and could be used as a yardstick in the division of marital property after divorce or during
inheritance. This is a campaign that had been launched 10 years earlier, at the Third UN World
Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985, and the lobby saw the outcome in Beijing as a huge success.
See Dzodzi Tsikata, supra note 3, at 9.
55 Smokin Wanjala, supra note 40, at 238. For similar arguments see also Achola Pala Okeyo, supra
note 18; Fiona Mackenzie, Gender and Land Rights in Murung'a District, Kenya, 17 J. PEASANT STUDIES
609 (1990); Kivutha Kibwana, supra note 9, at 21-29; Florence Butegwa, Women's Legal Right of Access
to Agricultural Resources in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1991 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 45.
6 The use of the 'national economic well-being' argument, and the emphasis on women's
contribution to development, rather than women's entitlement from development is strategic. This
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classify this approach as women in development (WID) because the
writers focus on women's productive contribution to and integration
into the development process, despite the fact that there has been a
conceptual shift in the field to a 'gender and development' (GAD)
approach. The focus of the gender and development (GAD) approach
is on fundamental questioning of underlying assumptions of existing
social, economic and political structures. 7 Since the mid 1980s, there
has been deeper questioning of the systematic assignment of women to
inferior roles both in the public and private sphere, and of the
assumptions underlying social, economic and political structures.
Most Kenyan scholars and activists who employ the women and
development discourse, however, fit more within the WID approach.
This may be as a matter of strategy, to appeal to the government by
appearing simply to be seeking integration rather than appear to be
calling for drastic restructuring of development institutions.
A. Inadequate/Reified Understanding of Culture and the
Law/Custom Dichotomy
The human rights and the women in development approaches have
two main shortcomings that parallel the shortcomings of the
mainstream property relations scholarship. First, when responding to
customary law-based challenges to women's capacity to own land,
they, like the imposition school, treat customary law as a fixed reality,
argument has been used by institutions such as the World Bank to be the sole justification for women's
participation in the development process. The World Bank, for instance, supports measures for the
integration of women' s contribution in the development process on grounds that failure to do so would
result in inefficient allocation of resources in the economy, and not because women are entitled to such
recognition or participation as a matter of right. See Mark Blackden and Elizabeth Morris-Hughes,
Paradigm Postponed: Gender and Economic Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Technical Department,
Africa Region, The World Bank 1993).
57 See Eva M. Rathgeber, WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice, 24 J. DEVELOPING
AREAS 489 (1990); Shahmshoub Razavi & Carol Miller, From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the
Women and Development Discourse, (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), Occasional Paper No. 1, UN Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995). Both articles trace
this conceptual shift. The WID approach which originated in the early 1970s is rooted in modernization
theory and the notion of development as a process of linear progress. It is an integrationist approach in
that it seeks to integrate women into the development process. It takes existing structures for granted,
except (third world) African traditions, which are viewed as obstacles that must be overcome so as to cure
under-development. (On this point, see Brian Tamanaha, supra note 15] In the second half of the 1970s,
there was a shift towards examining the question of women and development within the context of
international and class inequalities, and on micro level structures and relationships between women and
development processes, rather than simply on integrating women into the development process.
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which they take for granted. They make no attempt to evaluate these
challenges on their own terms. They do not attempt an informed
analysis of the basis of those challenges from within customary law
itself, for instance, to show that customary law is not a fixed system of
rigid rules; that flexibility and negotiability are, and have always been,
key characteristics of customary law. Instead, they respond with
'abolitionist' arguments. 58  I use the term 'abolitionist' to refer to the
human rights and development schools' response to customary law
based on external criteria: the human rights approach's
characterization of customary law as 'unconstitutional' and/or a
violation of human rights59; and the WID approach's characterization
of customary law as being an obstacle to development. These
responses create the impression that women's rights are a non-existent
issue in the sphere of custom or local practice, and therefore that the
solution lies in substituting custom and local practice with the
'progressive' solutions offered in national legislation or the human
rights regime.60  In these schools of thought, custom is the oppressor,
and human rights, or inclusion of women in development, is the
liberator.
This is the approach that has traditionally been adopted in legal
literacy and legal awareness campaigns, and also in various human
rights groups' approaches to legislative reform. The dominant
approach has been to presume that homogenization or uniformization
of the various personal law systems into a single statutory regime
holds the answer, particularly for women. This was the thinking
behind law reform efforts in the 1960s and 1970s aimed at
uniformizing the laws on marriage, divorce and succession 61, and on-
58 The term has been used by other writers critical of some approaches to human rights issues in
Africa. See Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-
Governmental Organizations 17 MICH. J. INT'L LAw 591 (1996) (Book Review).
59 Some analyses in this approach simply call for custom to be outlawed:
Customs and practices which discriminate against women should be declared
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience [and] must be outlawed.
Tibatemwa, supra note 29, at 79.
60 Thandabantu Nhlapo, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa:
Lessons From the South African Constitutional Debate, 9 INT'L J. LAW & FAMILY 208, 216 (1995).
61 In 1968, two commissions were set up, one to review the laws relating to marriage and divorce,
the other to review the laws on succession. Each was required, as part of its mandate, to draft, where
possible, a single law applicable to all Kenyans. See Report of the Commission on the Law of Succession
(1968), and Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage and Divorce (1968).
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going calls for such uniformization in the present context. 62 Legal
awareness campaigns (also referred to as human rights education
campaigns), for example with regard to succession, have focused on
the statutory regime and have tended to assume that they are teaching
women the 'better' system, which is a 'natural' choice over
(oppressive) custom.
These arguments invite a backlash as these approaches,
particularly the human rights approach, are easily seen as an external
and frontal attack on African customs and identity. This backlash
extends even to forums such as courts. An example of such backlash
is perhaps the S.M. Otieno case. The widow's lawyer's strategy was
to portray the deceased man, as well as his widow and children, as
having shunned tradition and embraced modernity. He therefore
focussed on showing how primitive and 'repugnant to justice and
morality' Luo customs were, and how discriminative they were against
women. This is a strategy that alienated many who were otherwise
sympathetic to the widow's claim, in a country where the majority,
including those who may be described as urbanized, see themselves as
drawing a sense of identity and community, to varying degrees, from
their tradition.63
Since abolitionist approaches characterize custom as the oppressor,
they throw out, or fail to acknowledge whatever 'benefits' exist for
women within (some) conceptions of customary tenure. There are, for
instance, some 'moral' claims to certain forms of property, which are
not legally enforceable at a formal level. Often, the sole basis for their
existence is a set of relationships embedded in, or given meaning by,
societal norms described as custom. One example is the claim of an
unmarried or divorced daughter with children. In the Akamba
community (my community), there has been a practice whereby [a]
father allocates such a daughter a piece of land that she cultivates to
feed her children. It is understood that she does not 'own' it, but her
cultivation 'rights' to it are recognized. On her parents' death, when
62 See, for example, Kenya Law Reform Task Force on the Review of Laws Relating to Women,
Preliminary findings on Marriage, Divorce, Matrimonial Property and Inheritance (unpublished, May
1996); Smokin Wanjala, supra note 40; Timothy Mweseli, supra note 40.
63 For further discussion of the case, see Nation Newspapers, S.M. Otieno: Kenya's Unique Burial
Saga (1987). See also DAVID WILLIAM COHEN & E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO, BURYING S.M: THE POLITICS
OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF POWER IN AFRICA (1992).
ACHIEVING GENDER EQUALITY
the land is divided up among the male heirs, usually her brothers, her
cultivation rights will be taken into account and she will be allowed to
continue using the land. I found it remarkable that all the people that I
spoke with during my field research affirmed this claim, without
exception. 64 Clearly, this is an arrangement that is heavily dependent
on the nature of the existing family relationships. There have been
cases of sibling rivalry, resulting in land disputes that may end in her
eviction. The formal legal institutions do not count for much when it
comes to securing or enforcing such a claim. In fact, there have been
court decisions which, purporting to apply customary law, have made
statements to the effect that unmarried daughters have no claim
whatsoever, on their father's estate. 65
Of course celebrating customary practices like this one would pose
dilemmas for people working to achieve gender equality. Winning
cultivation and occupancy rights for an unmarried or divorced
daughter with children will, of course, bring immediate benefits to her.
However, for gender equality this is not a real 'victory' because it is
premised on women's perceived 'temporary' or 'transient' nature in
their natal families. They do not achieve full control of resources on
an equal basis with their brothers, who are seen as the 'real' or
'permanent' members of the family. Daughters are only
accommodated in exceptional circumstances, namely when they fail to
get married, or then their marriages fail. Gaining something for an
individual woman in such circumstances still leaves the gender
hierarchy in the system intact.
Nonetheless, calling for a wholesale rejection of customary law
denies the reality of many women's lives. Some women draw a sense
of self and community, as well as their (sole) expectation of social and
economic security from this setting. Thus, an abolitionist approach
devalues the meaning that the 'cultural sphere' has for many women.66
6 1 am referring to field research that I conducted for my doctoral dissertation in Makueni district of
Kenya between June 1998 and February 1999. This field research is not the subject of this article, and I
only refer to it in an anecdotal manner here.
65 Wambugi w/o Gatimu-v-Stephen Nyaga Kimani, 2 KENYAN APPEAL REPORTS 292 (1992).
66 Karen Engle, in analyzing feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy, criticizes over-
valorization of the public sphere, which has resulted in undervaluing the meaning that some women attach
to the private (domestic) sphere. See Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the PubliclPrivate Distinction:
Strategizing Women 's Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 143
(Dorinda G. Dallmayer ed. 1993).
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It also amounts to asking women to choose between their gender
identity as women, and their cultural identity. 67  No wonder the
[human rights] message is alienating to many women, and an easy
target for charges of Western imperialism. One of the undisputed facts
about the women's rights movements in Kenya is that it has been
unable to incorporate into the movement on-going active organizing
by rural women at the grassroots.
B. Inadequate Analysis of Redefinition of Gender Relations in the
Struggle to Shape Custom
The second shortcoming of the human rights and the women in
development analyses is that they have not moved the discussion on
women and land beyond material conditions for survival and formal
equality, to a discussion on land as being about the very ability to
define (women's) personal and social identities, roles and
relationships. 68  This mirrors mainstream property relations
scholarship's lack of attention to power relations in the shaping of
custom. Women's struggle for land has been resisted through subtle
redefinition and revision of the rules of inclusion and exclusion of
membership from the vital group or network on the basis of which a
person's access to land is determined. Ownership of land in most
African communities is closely tied to one's membership and position
in a group, for example a clan or lineage. Anthropological studies
have shown that the conceptions of groups and networks are not fixed,
and are adjusted in response to changes such as scarcity and increased
competition for resources. 69 In response to women's struggle for land
67 A debate on how feminism approaches the intersection of gender and other aspects of identity
such as race, ethnicity and class has gone on in US feminist circles as the 'essentialism' debate. The
exchange between Catharine MacKinnon and Angela Harris is most instructive. The debate between them
revolves around MacKinnon's comments on a case [Santa Clara Pueblo-v- Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)]
in which a Native American woman challenged her tribe's constitutional provision on membership for
requiring women to give up tribal membership once they married outside the tribe. Men retained
membership even is they married out, and they could pass on membership to their children, unlike women
who married out. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 63 (1987) ("Whose Culture? A
Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
"' Parker Shipton and Mitzi Goheen, Understanding African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth and
Meaning, 62 AFRICA 307 (1992).
69 PAULINE PETERS, DIVIDING THE COMMONS: POLITICS, POLICY AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA
(1994). [See especially chapter 8, "Dividing the Commons: Belonging and Difference in the Kgatleng"]
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ownership and access, rules on group membership and acquisition of
interests in land have been redefined in an ad hoc manner so as to
exclude women. This experience is not confined to Kenya.70  The
legitimation of women's exclusion is not confined to land matters. It
is applied consistently across several social and political domains. For
example, the committees that adjudicate land claims during the land
adjudication process (the process that leads up to titling and
registration) are staffed exclusively by men. I observed this during my
field research in Makueni district, between June 1998 and February
1999. The all-male composition of the Land Adjudication Committees
and Arbitration Boards is justified on grounds that it is the knowledge
of elders familiar with the history of landholding in the area that is
relied on. Women are not elders, and they have no capacity to
adjudicate on land matters, since they have no capacity to own land in
the first place. 71
My concern with the legitimation of women's exclusion goes
beyond this concern with actual exclusion from political forums, such
as land adjudication committees. I am concerned also with the
resulting production of a particular image of women. Rationalizations
that invoke customary law to exclude women from control of
resources are applied in other contexts and gradually become
constitutive. The attitudes created become central to the way in which
gender identity and women's status is defined and perceived. Human
rights and development critiques have not taken the debate to this
level, and yet it is very crucial to do so.
An abolitionist approach does not employ a rigorous examination
of custom, and the manner in which it is being continually shaped. As
a result, critiques or initiatives that adopt this approach have failed to
notice, let alone acknowledge, the efforts being made by women 'from
within', so to speak, to improve the position assigned to women by
70 In colonial Zambia, for example, it was an accepted rule of land tenure in most communities that
persons were entitled to land which they had cleared. However, although husbands successfully invoked
this rule to retain rights in land which they had cleared, women who had cleared land could not do so.
Husbands began to assert ownership over land cleared by women on grounds that the women had cleared
the land as part of their wifely duties, and that the husbands owned their wives' labour. See Martin
Chanock, supra note 34, at 73-74.
71 See similar observations with respect to other parts of the country: Parker Shipton, The Kenyan
Land Tenure Reform: Misunderstandings in the Public Creation of Private Property, in LAND AND
SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA, 91,106 (R.E. Downs and S.P. Reyna eds. 1988).
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prevailing notions of custom, without necessarily appearing to
confront custom. There is constant renegotiation of roles and
entitlements within family and community, but this is difficult to
notice without close and sustained observation. Thus, although the
human rights approaches have been effective in giving visibility to the
issue of women and property, ignoring the efforts of women at the
grassroots level has had the inadvertent effect of portraying women
(particularly rural women) as passive victims, bound up in oppressive
tradition.
IV. DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GENDER, CUSTOM
AND PROPERTY RELATIONS IN A PLURAL LEGAL CONTEXT
What does the foregoing discussion say, then, about struggles to
secure women's access to land and other resources, in a context that
makes it easy, or at least possible, to exclude women simply by
invoking custom? One thing that is clear is that 'absolutist' and
abolitionist statements about women's rights to property will not get
very far, if they are phrased in such a manner as to suggest that human
rights are alien to the immediate social context in which women live.
They will also have little relevance unless they start from an informed
understanding of tradition, and are willing to see openings within it,
and to examine the ways in which women have used or have sought to
use these openings. These struggles must not ignore the ways in
which tradition has been influenced by the very same formal legal
institutions and processes that, at a procedural level, guarantee
equality. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that
these systems that guarantee formal equality are highly gendered too.
Therefore, it is necessary to appreciate, as a starting point, that
guarantees of equality in formal legislation and in the constitution and
human rights documents do not present us with a clear cut solution or
concrete and immediate benefits. The issue is complicated and our
search for solutions will have to be multifaceted.
In my view, the effort to develop more meaningful approaches in
dealing with gender and property relations in a plural legal context
needs to embrace at least four elements. First, it must be grounded in
an understanding of the interaction between formal law and custom.
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Second, it must take account of the intersectionality of gender and
culture. Third, it must engage the politics of the deployment of
culture, or the politics underlying the deployment of the law/custom
dichotomy. Finally, it must employ a 'critical pragmatic' approach to
pluralism.
The first three elements are concerned with developing an
appropriate conceptual framework for analysis: how can we describe
and discuss this issue in a manner that more accurately and sensitively
captures the social setting and the power relationships that we are
writing about? The fourth element represents an attempt to propose a
specific set of strategies that we can use to at least begin to address the
issue.
A. Conceptualizing Gender and Property Relations in a Plural
Legal Context
1. Understanding the law/custom interaction
I have identified the reification of a formal law/custom dichotomy
as a major shortcoming of both legal imposition (mainstream property
law scholarship) and human rights and development analyses. Thus, I
find it necessary to develop a conceptual approach that enables us to
talk about law and custom in a manner that is conscious of their
interconnectedness, and of the fact that they reinforce each other. I
have already used the example of the implementation of the land
registration policy in Kenya to show how ideas of custom permeate
and are used to justify the actions of the implementers of the policy,
such as the registration of 'male heads of households' in spite of the
absence of any statutory requirement to do so. This, together with the
highly individualist and absolutist conception of ownership embodied
in the Registered Land Act further weaken informal or unregistered
interests in property, where the majority of claims by women lie. The
intersection of formal law and official interpretations of custom
provides the justification for valuing some claims to property more
than others. One of the axes along which this asymetrical assignment
of value to interests in land occurs is gender.
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When it comes to addressing gender inequality to benefit women, a
rigid law/custom dichotomy is actually an inaccurate description of
reality. In the actual experience of living in a plural context, people do
not observe the boundaries between the various categories. People
continually cross back and forth through boundaries whose existence
is taken for granted in legal discourse, such as the boundary between
'customary' and 'official'. An example is the way in which the law on
marriage is set up in the Kenyan legal system. A marriage can be
governed either by statutory law72 or by Islamic law, Hindu law or
African customary law. But there is overwhelming evidence that the
boundaries between these various systems are not really observed. It
is common, for instance, to find that African Muslims practice a
combination of Islam and some notion of customs of the group to
which they belong, in regulating their interpersonal relationships. 73
Similarly, what may eventually be described as a statutory marriage
because it was celebrated in church or before the Registrar of
Marriages will often have been preceded by a series of family
negotiations and probably marriage payments believed to be required
under custom. 74 In advising a woman in such a setting on her marital
property rights for example, it would be highly decontextualized and
reductionist to pick on one system or the other, as the one that is
responsible for her oppression, or as the one that offers her liberation.
She inhabits both or all of these spheres, customary and official.
In understanding and trying to analyze this social reality, that
people weave in and out of several spheres in constructing their
relationships, I have found it helpful to borrow Sally Falk Moore's
framework of the 'semi-autonomous social field'. This is a framework
that she develops for the purpose of analyzing issues of law and social
change. A social field is any entity that has the capacity to internally
generate norms (rules, customs and symbols) that govern the conduct
of people living and relating within that social sphere, but which at the
72 A statutory marriage may be celebrated either under the Marriage Act or the African Christian
Marriage and Divorce Act. (Chapter 150 and 151 respectively, of the Laws of Kenya, 1962).
73 Women and Law in East Africa (WLEA-Kenya), Research Report on Inheritance Laws and
Practices in Kenya. (Okech-Owiti, Njeri Karuru, Winnie Mitullah & Kamau Mubuu eds. November,
1995).
74 Janet Kabeberi-Macharia & Celestine Nyamu, Marriage by Affidavit: Developing Alternative
Laws on Cohabitation in Kenya, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW 197, 205 (John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds. 1998).
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same time is vulnerable to norms (rules and decisions) emanating from
the larger social context by which it is surrounded.75 She characterizes
the relationship as one of semi-autonomy precisely because of the
simultaneous existence of this internal capacity for norm generation
and enforcement, as well as connection to a larger social matrix. The
operation of customary law and other systems of personal law in
contemporary Kenyan society may be characterized in these terms.
Far from seeing customary law as an autonomous entity, this
framework demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between custom
and formal legal institutions and processes.
From a semi- autonomous social field perspective, we are then able
to see that the state participates actively in the making and articulation
of 'custom'. As the larger social matrix, it defines the context within
which customary norms will be generated. Rules, decisions and
legislative enactments emanating from the larger social matrix do have
an influence on the social field. Legislative changes and other state-
engineered measures can therefore bring about change in a social
sphere in which custom operates, but this is not automatic, as Moore
cautions: "[R]elationships long established in persisting semi-
autonomous social fields are difficult to do away with instantly by
,, 76legislative measures'.
In relating with each other, people in a semi-autonomous social
field draw upon the internally generated norms, as well as the norms of
the larger social matrix. Within this framework, it is therefore possible
to conceive of people being able to strategically pick and choose from
both spheres, positive elements that benefit them. Women, for
example, could, in theory, utilize positive elements of both custom and
legislative or administrative procedures that give them a voice in
transactions involving marital property. In reality, however, this may
not be the case, since factors such as women's lack of knowledge of
the potentially beneficial measures under formal legislation come into
play. Accessibility and the cost of pursuing formal legal remedies also
75 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, in LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 54 (Sally Falk Moore ed.
1978). Moore draws on examples from two different contexts to illustrate this framework of analysis: the
loose enforcement of labour regulations in the dress industry in New York, and the Chagga, a community
living in the area around Mt. Kilimanjaro and their experiences with socialist policy in Tanzania.76 1d. at 74.
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matter. There are also instances when resort to statutory measures is
pre-empted, and the application of custom is the only legal possibility.
For instance, section 32 of the Law of Succession Act makes the
provisions of the statute inapplicable in certain districts (mostly
districts occupied by pastoral and nomadic peoples). A woman in any
of these districts does not have the option of statutory remedies. Using
this framework (and our critiques of its shortcomings, for instance its
silence on differences in knowledge and power, to invoke measures
availed by the larger social matrix) therefore, makes us sensitive to
structural constraints in the exercise of available options. It also
directs us to ask who has voice or the ability to participate in the
process of internal norm-generation, and consequently, whether it is
possible in particular cases to expect that the semi-autonomous social
field's self-reforming potential will be mobilized in favour of
disadvantaged actors within it. With regard to a specific issue, do
women exercise enough 'voice' in the articulation of custom, or can
we expect that women will exercise enough voice to influence a
change of customary law from within? This will draw our attention to
an analysis of the power relations inherent in articulating customary
law. Whose articulation or view of custom counts or is validated when
it comes to proceedings, such as in courts or in national debate?
2. Taking account of the intersectionalily of gender and
culture
An abolitionist approach that sees custom as the oppressor and
human rights as the liberator runs the risk of throwing out under the
'custom' label even those aspects in a culture that do hold some
benefits for some women. I referred to the sense of identity and
belonging that women draw from their cultural identity, as well as
tangible social and economic support from networks embedded in this
'cultural sphere'. I gave the example of an unmarried or divorced
daughter's 'customary' right to land for cultivation, in the Akamba
community.
At a conceptual level, an abolitionist approach presumes that it is
possible to speak of the oppression of women 'as women', and culture
as something outside of them, which oppresses them. Women are
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being acted upon by culture, so to speak. Gender equality exists only
outside of culture, and any woman challenging gender inequality must
position herself outside of, against or in opposition to her culture.
Such a woman must choose between her gender identity and her
cultural identity, a choice that does not exist in reality. Such an
approach stems out of a static view of culture as a system in which
people (specifically women) are assigned specific fixed statuses and
roles within it and over which they have no control. This is the view
of culture implied both in legal imposition and human rights and
development analyses.
Instead, we need an understanding of culture that is dynamic; one
that views culture as being constantly negotiated. When we take this
view of culture, we will recognize that most (if not all) women draw
social and economic support from networks that are embedded in, and
given meaning by this same 'cultural sphere'. 'Opting out' of our
cultural identity is therefore not a viable measure. This realization
makes us more alert to examine existing opportunities for women to
exercise more 'voice' in articulating and shaping culture. It also
makes us more attuned to women's voices in challenging norms and
practices within that culture, even when those challenges are not
framed in terms of 'opposition to culture'.
One example from my field research experience illustrates how
women may pose a challenge to cultural practices, without necessarily
calling attention to the fact that this is indeed what they are doing. In
many parts of rural Kenya, women have organized themselves into
women's groups which undertake various social and income-
generating projects. In Makueni and Machakos districts, where I did
my field research, these groups are organized as myethya. Myethya are
women's groups with old roots in traditional practices of labour
exchange, whereby women would get together and help each other, in
a rotational fashion, with household and farm tasks. The current
practice of myethya is an example of traditional social resources put to
new uses, in ways that challenge the 'traditional' distribution of
control over resources. Today myethya have become powerful
economic entities, and centers for social organizing for women. Some
of them operate as rotating credit schemes, investing in livestock
rearing, thus enabling their members to own assets. A few of them
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have managed to invest in land, enabling their members to own land,
either collectively or in individual sub-divided units, quite independent
of family-based networks.77 Recognizing this as a challenge to
cultural attitudes, in this case toward women's ability to manage and
control economic assets, pushes us to search for further avenues to
expand the opportunities for 'voice' in the quest for gender equality in
these settings.
Taking account of the intersectionality of gender and culture needs
to have as its starting point a recognition of the need for "a dialogue
which reflects the complexities of pursuing the goal (gender equality)
in tandem with other goals (cultural diversity and autonomy)".7 8
3. Engaging the politics of culture
Which patterns of behaviour were accepted as legitimate
customary law is a part of the political history of the colonial period
and which patterns of behaviour are now put forward as representative
of custom is likewise a matter of current politics.
79
An approach that is willing to engage the politics of culture
demands that we go behind every assertion of custom to examine the
power relations behind it. It should lead us to ask questions like the
following. What historical circumstances have led to the formation of
the category we have now come to know as African customary law?
Who has had a say in deciding what gets to be termed 'customary'
law? What alternative views were or have been omitted in arriving at
the prevailing idea of what is 'customary'? What use is made of
customary law at any given historical moment, for instance, in setting
up structures of local government, in the practice of courts, in
constitutional jurisprudence and in local and national politics?
77 Information gathered from interviews with women and women's group leaders, and from
observation, in Kathulumbi location, Makueni district, between July 1998 and January 1999. But
women's groups are also plagued by problems, such as interference and exploitation by politicians, since
they are a sound grassroots base for political support. Many of the leaders I spoke to saw the involvement
of politicians as a weakening of the groups, and sought to distance themselves from it.
78 Penelope E. Andrews, Introduction: Women's Rights and Traditional Law: A Conflict, 1994-95
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES ix.
79 Martin Chanock, Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law
Reform, 3 INT'L J. LAw & FAMILY 72, 86 (1989).
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Various writings in legal anthropology and in legal history have
examined these questions in discussing customary law in the context
of other African countries. These writings can be summed up in three
categories. First, some writings employ a Marxist inspired class
analysis of the instrumental and ideological use of customary law,
which allows the narrow interests of a particular class to be presented
as the general interests of a community.80 These writings seek to make
a direct link between the production of customary law, and the
"subordination of African social formations to capitalist relations".8
Second, there are writings that. avoid a Marxist analysis, but
nonetheless, employ power relations and hierarchy as the lens through
which they analyze the making of customary law. In particular, they
take issue with the tendency to portray customary law (or indigenous
institutions generally) as egalitarian and harmonious, and point out that
these are "expressive not simply of communal life, but of a way of
maintaining order and relations of power".8 2 Customary law is one
among the resources used in struggles over property, labour, power
and authority. The third category of writings are those that
acknowledge power asymmetries in the making and operation of
customary law, but do not see this as the whole story. For example,
the protection of a particular group's interests is not the only factor in
explaining the presentation of customary law as rigid and unchanging.
Rather, customary law is analyzed as part of a process of
'regularization'; a reconciliation between ideology (the way in which a
community presents itself) and social reality. A process of producing
seemingly durable customs, rules, symbols and categories, that in
80 This analysis is to be found most explicitly in the work of Francis Snyder. See FRANCIS SNYDER,
CAPITALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: AN AFRICAN TRANSFORMATION (1981); Colonialism and Legal Form:
The Creation of 'Customary Law' in Senegal, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL LAW 49 (1981).
8 "Francis Snyder, Colonialism and Legal Form, supra note 80, at 51.
82 Martin Chanock, supra note 79, at 74. See also MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL
ORDER, supra note 39. Other writings in this mode include MAHMOUD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT:
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996); Kristin Mann & Richard
Roberts, Introduction: Law in Colonial Africa, in LAw IN COLONIAL AFRICA, 3 (Mann & Roberts eds.
1991). Sally Falk Moore may be placed in this category since she disputes the presumed egalitarianism,
and also stresses unequal power in people's ability to shape and manipulate, not just customary law, but
law and social regulation broadly. Commenting on 'customary' practices relating to inheritance,
bridewealth and obligations of 'gift-giving to kin', she writes, "But it is only the most prosperous who can
afford to meet the traditional obligations of paternity ... The well-to-do can be at once both more modem
and more traditional than their less fortunate relatives... The poor cannot afford to be properly traditional
and they certainly cannot afford to be modem." She then asks, "Who made the rules? Who set the
measure of virtue in terms that only some could satisfy'?" MOORE (1986) supra, note 36, at 300.
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reality serve to mask the indeterminacy and changing nature of the
social reality; the articulation of customary law in rigid and precise
terms versus variation and conflict on the ground. This process takes
place not only at the level of interpersonal relationships, but also in
broader political contexts.8 3
I present this typology to show that there is a body of scholarship
that has examined the power relations inherent in the history of the
production of the category of customary law, both in the colonial and
post-colonial setting. They deal with the macro-politics of producing
customary law. I would like to take this analysis and apply it
especially in situations where custom is cited as a basis for excluding
women. In such situations we must cease to see custom or culture
simply as a description of a way of life. Rather, we must see it as
being about relations of power. Whose power is being placed beyond
reach or beyond question, by the simple move of designating such
exercise of power as customary or cultural? Is the label of culture
being deployed to put an end to what should be an open political
debate, and to preserve certain social arrangements? What power
relations are made invisible?
Employing an abolitionist approach endorses characterizations or
articulations of custom that are disadvantageous to women as an
accurate description of reality. Rather than question the presentation
of custom in this manner, an abolitionist response takes that
presentation for granted, and replies in the language of human rights,
thus ceding the ground of culture to those defining or articulating it so
as to exclude or prejudice women. Engaging the politics of culture
entails occupying the ground of culture and challenging such
articulation of culture on its own terms, even going as far as pointing
out existing or potential alternative accounts of culture.
Julie Stewart shows that this is not only possible, but is already
been done by women's groups in Zimbabwe.8 When the government
proposed changes in the inheritance laws in 1996, representatives from
women's organizations had a meeting with twelve chiefs from
13 1 am referring specifically to the work of Sally Falk Moore. See, in particular, Uncertainties in
Situations, Indeterminacies in Culture, in LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978).
This is a framework that she employs generally in her longer work, MOOR-E SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 36.
" Julie Stewart, Why I Can't Teach Customary Law, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW 217, 221-222 (J. Eekelaar & T. Nhlapo eds. 1998).
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different ethnic groups and provinces and Ministry of Justice officials.
Several court decisions had upheld the 'rule' that the eldest son was
always his father's heir. When this position was stated to the chiefs,
they disagreed, and stated that the underlying principle is that the
family of the deceased person (and there could be varying definitions
of which members constitute the family) must be provided for from
the property left by the deceased person. However, this principle
could be accomplished by a variety of arrangements, depending on
specific family situations, and it is not always accomplished by
passing property to the eldest son.
85
Occupying the ground of culture also means challenging legal
projects that have codified customary law, and that purport to give
ready and complete answers to legal practitioners on what 'the custom'
of a given ethnic group with regard to a particular matter is. One
source that is referred to very often in Kenyan courts is Cotran's
codification of the various customary laws on marriage and divorce.
86
These codifications give a very static and ossified version of custom,
denying the reality that 'custom' is a matter of practice, and this is
constantly evolving. Julie Stewart's suggestion is that we need to
intervene in court processes, with empirical research work on current
practices, and with empirical evidence of the variation in customary
practice. We need to overcome the impression created by the
codifications, that there is only one rigid notion of custom, and we can
only do this by making the evidence to the contrary available to the
judges.87
85 Stewart's paper is rich with examples from field research conducted on behalf of the Women and
Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) Project that point to flexible practice that contradicts the 'customary law
in the books' (case law). She quotes one headman:
One of my neighbours died and was survived by only female children. We
distributed his many cattle and other property among his daughters. The brothers
and other close relatives of the deceased decided on this and the rest of us and the
community had no problems with it as it is our custom.
Id. at 223.
86 EUGENE COTRAN, THE LAw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN KENYA, (Restatement of African
Law series, 1968). See also EUGENE COTRAN, CASEBOOK OF KENYA CUSTOMARY LAW (1987).
87 Julie Stewart, supra note 84.
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B. Employing a 'Critical Pragmatic' Approach to Pluralism
In a critical pragmatic approach to pluralism, the concern will not
be so much with identifying a particular component in the plural
normative legal order as responsible for causing or remedying
disadvantage. Rather, whatever system is operating, or when a
particular disadvantage is occasioned by an interaction between or
among the various normative orders, the question needs to be whether
it produce consequences that further deepen gender inequality.
I borrow the term 'critical pragmatism' from Joseph Singer.
Pragmatism as a school of thought is concerned with the actual
working of law in a social setting as the basis for evaluating law, rather
than with conceptual neatness; a concern with results. Critical
pragmatism, according to Singer, goes much further than this, to a
concern with results for specific (oppressed) groups in society: When
we ask ourselves whether a social or legal practice works, we must ask
ourselves, 'works for whom?' Who benefits and who loses from
existing political, economic, and legal structures? 89  [Emphasis in
original]
Working for gender equality in property relations in a plural legal
context requires a move toward focusing on results or consequences
for gender hierarchies. In the specific context of property relations
under Kenya's plural normative orders, this means evaluating from a
critical pragmatic perspective: the consequences of presenting
customary property arrangements in a static way that assigns fixed
roles and statuses; the consequences of entrenching an individualist
absolutist conception of private property in our land statutes; and the
consequences of choosing to accommodate pluralism in such a manner
as to set up a 'private sphere' of personal laws that is beyond
constitutional challenge, as section 82(4) does.
On the constitutional issue, which is fundamental, a critical
pragmatic approach would ask why it is that the exception in section
82(4) only extends to the issues of marriage, adoption, divorce, burial
and devolution of property on death? Why does it not affect other
"Joseph Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and
Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L.REv. 1821 (1990).
" d. at 1841.
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areas of operation of customary law? Marriage, divorce and death are
key events for defining and reconstituting property rights, particularly
for women and children, whose access to economic resources is
heavily dependent on family networks, specifically their relationships
to fathers or husbands. What are the consequences for pre-empting
individuals' access to constitutional protection with regard to these
matters? The result is to deny constitutional protection to women and
children during moments when they may need it the most to resolve
any conflicts that may arise with regard to their access to economic
resources necessary for their survival.
We could go further and question the necessity of having a
provision such as section 82(4) in the Constitution in the first place.
Are there other ways to recognize cultural and religious pluralism and
accommodate the operation of personal laws, without exacting such a
heavy cost on some groups in society? The South African Constitution
provides an alternative set up. It recognizes the validity and operation
of traditional authority, as well as a right to enjoy and practice one's
culture, but it makes the exercise of traditional authority and the
operation of customary law subject to the constitution. This means
that the exercise of traditional authority and the operation of customary
law can be challenged under the Bill of Rights.9 As Justice Yvonne
Mokgoro of the South African Constitutional Court puts it, political
necessity required the recognition of traditional authority, but justice
demanded that the exercise of their powers be subjected to
constitutional scrutiny.9 1
A critical pragmatic approach also calls for engagement at multiple
sites. We need to recognize that both the 'traditional sphere' and
formal legal institutions present difficulties and possibilities for
women. The starting point would therefore be for women to examine
90 Section 211 (1) states:
The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary
law, are recognized subject to the constitution.
Section 211(3) states:
The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the
constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.
See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May
1996.
91 Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional Authority and Democracy in the Interim South African
Constitution, 3 REV. CONST'L STUDIES 60 (1996). See also T. Nhlapo, supra note 39.
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what options exist for them at a particular moment, with regard to a
particular problem, and to take advantage of them.
For instance, activists for gender equality in property relations
often focus on the laws of marriage and divorce and succession, and
rarely take on the actual statutes dealing with land. Yet is it important
both to identify sources of gender inequality in these apparently
neutral statutes, as well as measures within the existing framework of
the statutes that can be used to redress gender inequality.
92
To a certain extent, there are groups that are already responding to
the need to engage at multiple sites. Rather than present statutory
measures and 'human rights', in a narrow sense, as alternatives to
custom, their approach is one of options. I am referring specifically to
the work of two regional African organizations; Women and Law in
East Africa (WLEA) and Women and Law in Southern Africa
(WLSA). Both organizations combine research and activism on legal
and social issues affecting women in their respective regions. They
carry out participatory research in both rural and urban areas, paying
particular attention to the lived reality of women. In WLEA's
methodology, emphasis is placed on "collecting empirical data on
women's experiences in the context of both formal and informal laws
including social custom, morals and practices". 93 On legal awareness
programs, WLSA's position is that "it is vital that legal education and
action programmes alert women to the alternative or other options
open to them". They recognize that "empowerment for some women
may even involve using informal customary structures in order to
enforce the obligations [under] customary law". 94
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article started by appraising approaches to custom in
considering gender and property relations. My appraisal focused on
92 I do not actually carry out such an analysis of property law statutes here, but see Celestine Nyamu,
Legal Research Report on Women, Marriage, and Management of Resources (Women and Law in East
Africa (WLEA-Kenya), (Internship assignment report on file with the author and with WLEA-Kenya,
August 1997).
93 Women and Law in East Africa, Discussion Draft for the Research Project on Women in Marriage
and Resource Management 9 (1997).
" Women and Law in Southern Africa, Beyond Research: WLSA in Action 6 (Working Paper
No.10, 1995).
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the analyses presented by mainstream property law scholars and
human rights and 'women in development' scholars and activists. I
identified and discussed two major shortcomings of both schools,
namely the reification of a dichotomy between custom and formal
legal processes and institutions, and the failure to engage with the
power relations inherent in the shaping of customary law. With
respect to the first shortcoming, mainstream property law attributes
gender inequality to 'imposed' Western institutions, thus glorifying an
egalitarian 'customary' past in which women's property rights were
protected. Human rights and development analysis, on the other hand,
blames custom as the oppressor of women, and offers human rights
and equal recognition of women's role in the development process as
the liberator. With respect to the second shortcoming, both
approaches, in failing to engage with the power relations of the
shaping of customary law, also pay no attention to ways in which
gender relations get redefined too in this process.
I have argued for a different strategy toward achieving the goal of
gender equality with respect to property relations in a plural legal
context. Such a strategy needs to be premised on an understanding of
the interaction between custom and formal legal processes and
institutions. It also needs to take into account the intersection of
gender and culture, and be ready to meet assertions of rigid notions of
custom with empirical evidence of the flexibility, variety and richness
or contemporary local practice. This strategy, which I have labeled 'a
critical pragmatic approach to pluralism', must recognize that the
various normative orders in our plural legal context offer both setbacks
to gender equality and the resources for challenging such inequality.
A critical pragmatic approach to pluralism calls upon us to be willing
to engage at multiple sites. The key focus of our engagement should
be the consequences for vulnerable women and the effects on gender
hierarchies.

